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Participatory Welfare in South Korea :
Meaning and Issues
Raymond K. H. Chan1
Abstract
‘Participatory Welfare’ is the term coined by the current Roh
Moo-hyun government to distinguish its welfare reform from the
previous Kim Dae-jung government’s ‘Productive Welfare’ policies.
While the use of term ‘participatory’ is a convenient extension of its
slogan ‘Participatory Government’, the details of Participatory
Welfare are still evolving and results have yet to be seen. Observed
from the documents and policies proposed or implemented so far, it
has two key dimensions: promoting ‘participation’ and building up
of a ‘welfare community’. The reforms are located in a context of
civil society calling for greater participation and reforms in an
increasingly polarized society. Besides continuing the reforms
initiated by the previous government, new and strengthened
emphasis has been put on promoting welfare rights and
redistributions, fostering gender equality and inclusion, and the
citizen’s participation in the provision and management of welfare
services. Yet, it also emphasizes the traditional view of individual
and community responsibility. The reforms are both progressive and
conservative in nature and are still to be subjected to reality’s test.
The reforms are facing challenges from the opposition – political
parties, traditional elites, bureaucracy, capitalists and even the trade
1
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unions. It is doubtful whether the community and individuals are so
ready to take up the expected roles and duties.
Welfare Development in Korea
Kwon Huck-ju has described Korea’s welfare system before
the financial crisis as following welfare developmentalism.
Economic development was the overwhelming concern of the
contemporary Korea welfare state, taking priority over social
protection (1999, 2002). Major features of the system have
been a strong regulatory system, low public expenditure, and
limited income redistribution with a strong emphasis on the
informal sector’s contribution. Kwon criticizes such
developmental model as having at least three problems:
a) the lion’s share of the resources went to the high income
earners and the chaebols (business conglomerates)
reflecting an increasingly unequal society;
b) social policy making was confined to a small number of
top-level policy makers, with low accountability and
transparency;
c) public welfare system mainly catered for the regular
workers (waged and salary earners), leaving behind the
irregular and unemployed workers with nominal welfare
protection (2002).
Responding to the Financial Crisis, President Kim Dae-jung
launched ‘Productive Welfare’ in 1999. Influenced by the
‘Third Way’ concept, this policy placed greater emphasis on
welfare as an effective instrument to improve economic
productivity and, in addition to protection, to enhance Korea’s
competitiveness in the global market (Presidential Office,
2000). He argued that this approach was different from the
2

past as it recognized the social rights to a decent living for
every citizen and acknowledged the state responsibility for
delivering that goal. During his time in office, Kim reformed
and extended the coverage the National Pension System
(NPS) 2 , integrated the National Health Insurance (NHI),
expanded the coverage of Employment Insurance System to
smaller sized firms (EIS) and introduced the Minimum Living
Standard Guarantee (MLSG). Productive Welfare policies
sought to achieve an integrated balance between economic
growth and social protection. It adopted policies which
expand the state’s role and welfare right, but at the same time,
it also introduced the elements of neo-liberal reforms (e.g.
flexible labour market, welfare to work and workfare) (Chan,
2003; Kim Y H, 2003).
The overall response to Productive Welfare reforms was
positive. Lee comments that ‘for the first time in Korean
history, welfare reforms came to be appreciated as an
institutional means to keep democracy and market economy
sustainable’ and placed in the mainstream political discourses
and national policy agenda (2004:293). Civil society has
actively participated in shaping the agenda and policy (e.g. in
Maternity Protection Scheme and National Basic Livelihood
Security Act) (Lee H K, 2004: 297). Policies have reduced
status segmentation with stronger emphasis on redistribution
and universalism (Kim Y M, 2001, 2005). The reformed
pension and insurance schemes show a strong sense of
solidarity and national scale of risk diffusion and income
redistribution within and between generations (Kim Y M &
Kim K S, 2005). Kwon argues that with these reforms, Korea
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has gradually moved beyond developmental model with
improved accountability (2003).
Context for Participatory Welfare
Nevertheless, problems of transparency, efficiency, high
stratification effects between regular and irregular workers,
inadequate protection of the poor, and inadequate welfare
services for children and the family are still there (Kim Y M,
2001, 2005).3 These probably constitute the contextual factor
of Participatory Welfare, which is to address the demand for
wider participation in policy making and to tackle social
problems accumulated for decades.
The issue of social polarization has caught much attention,
partly as a result of the liberalization reform under the
Productive Welfare. Polarization can be reflected in widening
income gap (and different benefits received from the social
security system) between regular and irregular workers,
between workers in large-sized companies (e.g., chaebols) and
small and medium-sized enterprises SMEs, and between
income classes.
Currently, 50 per cent of the waged earners are irregular
workers in Korea. The number of temporary and daily
workers increased by 19.6% from 1997 to 20024 (Ministry of
Labor, 2003). The number of elementary occupations has also
increased by 18.8%5 from 1998 to 2004. The regular workers
are the insiders who are more powerful in influencing their
3
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employment conditions than the outsiders – the irregular
workers (Bank of Korea, 2005). These are the results of the
neo-liberal flexible labor market reforms from the 1990s (Chan,
2003; Kim C K, 2004).
Wages in large companies are far better than for those
employed in small companies. In August 2003, the wage gap
between temporary and permanent employees in large firms
and SMEs was 48.6% and 52.0%, respectively (the overall gap
was 48.6%) (Lee B H, 2005). The wage gap between companies
with 500 workers or more and those with 30 workers or less
increased from 1.4 times in 1995 to 1.6 times in 2002. Bonuses
and severance pays of non-regular workers were, respectively,
31.7% and 44.1% of those of regular workers in the 2002
Workplace Panel Survey by the Korea Labor Institute
(Ministry of Labor, 2003).
The Gini coefficient measurement in Korea demonstrates there
has been a widening income inequality since 1990s. Though
the figures provided by the Report of Income and Expenditure
Trends of Urban Salary and Waged Earners’ Households (RIE)
are not that alarming, the results of the National Survey of
Household Income and Expenditures (NSIE), which include
the data of those irregular workers such as self-employed,
unemployed and single-person households, reflects a more
worrying trend (see Table 1). Kim Sang-kyun warns that the
income gap will be further widened if the calculation includes
the assets of different income classes. He comments that on an
ideological level, Koreans are concerned with the issues of
social justice, equality and protecting the disadvantaged; and
redistribution is a proper means to achieve these objectives.

5

Table 1: Gini Coefficient, 1995 - 2001
Year

Gini Coefficient
RIE

NSIE

1995

.284

.332

1996

.291

--

1997

.283

--

1998

.316

--

1999

.320

--

2000

.317

--

2001

.319

.389

Source: Yoo & Kim, 2002

Generally speaking, lower and lower middle income classes
have suffered more since the Financial Crisis of 1997-98. While
middle and upper-middle income class are not so affected, the
high income class actually increased in numbers, which
reflects a trend of growing income polarization. These trends
are also ‘inherently destructive’ to social sustainability (Kim C
K, 2004).
The coefficient of regional variation also increased from 0.15
in 1993 to 0.255 in 2001. Seoul, Gyeonggi and cities like Busan,
Incheon and Daegu record the lowest incidence of poverty,
while provinces in the South-east and Southwest (i.e.,
Jeonnam, Jeonbuk, Gyeongbuk and Gyeonnam) record the
highest. Though this may not entirely due to favouritism (it
could have mainly resulted from comparative advantage), it is
an issue which has been manipulated by the politics of power
elites to mobilize regional sentiments, and so such a
phenomenon cannot be neglected by Roh’s government (Kim
W B, 2003:680).
6

Participatory Welfare can also be understood as a natural
response to the growing demands for participation; to balance
elite-bureaucrat domination in policy making and improve
accountability and transparency. Both Kim Snag-kyun and
Kim Yeon-myung agree that Participatory Welfare is more or
less an extended part of the Roh’s participatory political
reforms. Even Participatory Welfare can be simply interpreted
as a political-administrative terminology.
During the presidential election campaign in 2002, Roh used
Participatory Government as his slogan and pledged to put an
end to the old politics (i.e., conservatism, regionalism,
cronyism, factionalism, confrontational conflicts and
corruption) and vowed to build up a new society and era of
politics in Korea which emphasised pan-national cohesion,
true participatory democracy, clean and people-centred
government. He claimed that the government is ‘of the
people’ wherein the people can participate in all government
affairs (Soon H C, 2004:47).
His election campaign also resorted to such participatory
strategies. For example, the Millennium Democratic Party
(MDP) introduced primaries for presidential-candidate
nominations and separated presidential power from the party,
which lead to a more modern party image. Approximately 1.8
million voters participated in the party primaries that selected
35,000 delegates. The primaries further enhanced the MDP’s
reformist image by selecting Roh Moo-hyun, a person with a
reform bent and populist image, rather than the famous
frontrunner, Rhee In-je (Hoon J, 2003).
In the 2002 presidential election, liberal voters increased to
41.1% (compared to 32.7% in 1992), while conservative and
7

moderate voters declined to 26.7% and 32.3% respectively
(compared to 40.3% and 41.9% in 1992). About 70% of the
younger voters consider themselves as liberal, while older
adults (aged 40 to 49) are tilted toward conservatism (Hoon J,
2003). Roh’s political platform tapped into the beliefs and
desires of these demands for reforms, especially from an
increasingly active younger generation in Korea (Larsen, 2003).
No matter whether the government truly sponsors these or
not, it has to respond to such calls.
Participatory strategies are also responding to the increasing
influence of civil society in Korea. During the 1990s the civil
society movement gradually shifted from concerns over class
and political conflicts to the promotion of the common good
of society. Civil society became more committed to the
promote public interest in a wider variety of topics, in the
process of consolidation of democratization (Lee C H,
2004:57).
Participatory Welfare Reforms
Kim Yeon-myung observes that the term Participatory
Welfare was only adopted after Participatory Government
was selected as the election campaign slogan. So this is not a
well-planned policy initially, but something that gradually
evolved in the process. The welfare part of it is more or less a
continuation of the previous policies with the addition of new
measures to promote equality, inclusion and greater
protection, especially for those groups which are considered
to have been neglected previously, such as women, elderly,
children and irregular workers. Kim Sang-kyun argues that
creating a new term reflects Roh’s desire to have his own
distinctive policy platform, which can also help to respond to
8

the sentiment against rapid welfare expansion under the
Productive Welfare period.
When Roh won the election, the government announced
twelve policy goals which included amongst them to ‘improve
participatory welfare and quality of life’. Objectives under this
goal are to ‘develop a full-fledged national health care system’,
‘promote national welfare with focus on guaranteeing
minimum livelihood, childcare, and support for senior
citizens and the handicapped’ and ‘create a prosperous and
stable society’. Other related policy goals include fostering a
society of balanced development between economic growth
and distribution, different regions, different classes, labour
and management; and to promote sustainable development
and gender equality.
In May 2003, Roh established the Participatory Welfare
Planning Group to study the details of the reforms. In January
2004, the Planning Group released the five years’ plan on
participatory welfare, with more concrete policy areas, actions
and outcomes proposed for the government to consider.
The paper describes the vision of this policy as:
1. to create a healthier, wealthier and more pleasant society
where the state spearheads the efforts to satisfy the basic
demands in public health, welfare, habitation, environment
and culture;
2. to allow everyone to take part in decisions and enjoy the
services desired by the public.

9

Six major policy objectives have been proposed in that policy
paper, which are more or less the same as the previous
announcements6:
1. Establish a health insurance system that safeguards
people's health throughout their lives [MOHW];
2. Actualize ‘welfare for all Koreans’, in which not only the
needy but also the elderly, the disabled, women and
children can feel the benefits [MOHW];
3. Enhance sovereign competitiveness by solving childcare
problems and expanding social participation of women
[MOHW & MOGE];
4. Create a society with no worries about housing by
stabilizing the housing prices and improving residential
welfare [MOCT];
5. Build a sustainable ‘green’ nation through coexistence of
environment and economy, and harmony between
development and preservation [MOE]
6. Improve quality of life through cultural welfare, a basic
right for the people [MCT].
Apart from the conventional core concerns of welfare policies
(i.e., items 1 to 3), the policy expands to incorporates housing
policy, sustainable development and cultural welfare. The
latest information on the Participatory Welfare policies can be
found in the publication, ‘Dynamic Korea: A Nation on the
Move’ edited by Korea Development Institute and Ministry of
Finance and Economy published in June 2004.

6

Relevant ministries are listed in brackets after each policy. MOHW is Ministry of
Health and Welfare; MOGE is Ministry for Gender Equality [renamed as Ministry of
Gender Equality and Family in 2005]; MOCT is Ministry of Construction and
Transport; MCT is Ministry of Culture & Tourism; MOE is Ministry of Environment.
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Echoing its context, the strategies of Participatory Welfare can
be broadly divided into two dimensions: ‘participatory’
policies and ‘welfare’ policies. The document states that
Productive Welfare still considers welfare as in conflict with
growth while the government gave priority to growth.
Based on their ideological belief and analysis of the social
conditions, Roh’s government aims to build up an ‘advanced
democratic nation’ with an efficient ‘welfare community state’
overcoming the deficits of the past centralized and limited
welfare system (KDI & MOFE, 2004:312).
Comparing with the previous Productive Welfare policy, the
current government suggests that participatory welfare has its
particular distinctiveness:
Table 2: Comparison between Productive and Participatory Welfare
Ideas of Productive Welfare

Ideas of Participatory Welfare

Pursue a welfare state through
expansion of public welfare

Pursue a welfare community state
through participation of citizens (P)

Recognize growth and economic
preferentialism based on the
relationship between growth and
distribution, and between economy
and welfare

Recognize harmonious relations
between growth and distribution,
and between economy and welfare
(W)

Denotative expansion of welfare

Strengthen the efficiency and
systematic functioning of welfare
(W / P)

Lack a coordination system for
social conflicts caused by the
process of preparing for the welfare
system

Establish a democratic coordination
system for social conflicts through
active participation of citizens (P)

Source: KDI & MOFE, 2004:314
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‘Welfare community state’ seems to be a new term in Korea,
described as,
The universal welfare system covers all members of
society (including individuals, private organizations, and
the government) participate to establish a social safety net
and welfare system as well as to contribute to economic
growth and distribution. In addition, society equally
shares the achievements and benefits so that all members
of society will together pursue national development and
social stability (KDI & MOFE, 2004:312).
In this welfare community, a ‘three-fold layered social safety
net’ will be built up by the individuals (and families),
communities (neighbours, religion, charity, social welfare, and
private organizations) and nation (government). In this
construction, individuals (and families) have to work to be
self-supportive, contribute to the social insurance schemes and
the nation’s social safety net. The community will deliver its
obligation to support individuals in need and the nations in
providing welfare. The nation will strengthen the social
safety net, independent from individuals and communities,
ensure the provision of basic medical, housing, education and
living support to all people irrespective of their income, and
play a leading role in expanding citizen’s participation in
community activities. Such welfare community is managed
by better coordination, systematization, connection,
mobilization and integration among the private welfare
networks in the communities which are currently dispersed in
communities; and with public welfare system (KDI & MOFE,
2004:312-313).
In this welfare regime, ‘participation’ can be referred as
individuals and communities participating in ‘providing’ and
12

‘managing’ welfare to those in need, which are, in fact,
constructed as their obligations (KDI & MOFE, 2004:313).
Participation also means fostering the participation of
excluded social groups to be re-included into mainstream
social and work life by social policy and legislation. So,
Participatory Welfare, on one hand, represents a further
consolidation of the notions of citizens’ rights for welfare, and
state’s roles in providing welfare provisions. However, on
another hand, the policy also re-emphasizes the traditional
family and individual’s roles, which is more or less the same
as the conventional construct of the so-called East Asian
Welfare Model.
Major welfare policies proposed or introduced include (KDI &
MOFE, 2004) include:
1. Social security system:
1.1 Social assistance: improve National Basic Livelihood
Security System (such as selection criteria and asset
check, efficiency, benefit level). Expected to have more
beneficiaries: 1.38 million in 2003 to 1.6-1.8 million in
2008.
1.2 National Health Insurance: increase contributions and
reduce out-of-pocket payments, increase coverage
especially for the poor through medical care scheme,
activate supplementary private insurance and
planning of Long Term Care insurance.
1.3 National Pension Scheme: strengthen the financial
sustainability by increasing the contribution rate
(increase from 9% by 1.38% in every 5 years from 2010,
to 15.9% until 2030, reduce income replacement rate
from 60% to 50% by 2008, synergy with private
pension).
13

1.4 Employment Insurance System: extend coverage to
casual workers working less than a month, workers
working at least 15 hours per week and newly
employed workers aged 60 or older are also included
from January 2004.
1.5 Rationalise the management: including collection of
tax and levy for pension, health insurance and EIS
contribution, curb under-report and non-report of
income.
2. Social welfare services:
2.1 Improve the efficiency of social service delivery
system and to network community resources,
establish Community Welfare Councils in cities and
provinces starting from 2005 and pilot social welfare
office under local governments to increase efficiency,
and to solicit / coordinate community resources.
2.2 Improve and increase child care services by
government’s investment, and require large sized
private companies to provide that services by
legislation.
2.3 Aging society challenges: greater attention to address
the needs and problems arising from rapid aging
society, and proposes measures to stabilize child birth
rate, family-work balance policies, and work for the
elderly.
3. Promoting gender equality and preventing discrimination:
3.1 establish a fair and transparent system under the
principle of equal opportunity, and new mechanism,
such as Gender Discrimination Improvement
Commission
and
National
Human
Rights
Commission.
14

3.2 introducing global standards to Korean society
4. Labour policy:
The current government continues the previous social
investment strategies on human capital formation, and
employment services to targeted groups (such as women,
the aged, the disabled, non-regular workers and
low-income earners). Public work programmes continued
to provide mainly social service jobs for the marginal
labour groups. Flexible labour market reforms were also
continued (KOIS, 2003; Ministry of Labor, 2003; 2004).
4.1 Promoting Aged Employment: expand the list of
occupations listed in the Aged Employment Promotion
Act preferentially assigned to the age, from 70
categories to 160 categories (70 and 90 in public and
private sectors respectively) in June 2003. In July the
same year, the government differentiated the standard
employment ratio of the aged into 2% for
manufacturing; 6% for real estates, renting and leasing;
6% for transportation and 3% for others instead of
applying the same ratio of 3% to all industries.
4.2 Foreign worker permit system adopted in 2005 to
protect the foreign workers and the facilitate SMEs to
recruit workers.
4.3 Employment conditions: National Assembly passed
the five-day workweek bill on 29 August 2003 after a
three-year long debate between labour and
management. Minimum wage: The minimum wage
applicable from September 1, 2003 to August 31, 2004
is 2,510 won per hour (20,080 won for a standard
8-hour work day).
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4.4 Irregular workers: prepare legislation for better
protection of irregular workers (as the bill also calls for
greater flexibility for employment, it has been strongly
questioned by Korean trade union movement).
4.5 Labour relations: gradually adopted a tougher
approach to handle industrial disputes, management
will have greater power in layoffs and better protection
against walkouts, no work no pay principles will be
enforced during illegal strike/walkout, disciplinary
measures against unruly behaviour (such as
occupation of facilities, blocking entrance to offices,
interfering with operations of non-unionists and
actions of violence, destruction and blackmailing).
‘Participatory’ is in line with the Roh’s government’s national
agenda to enhance participatory politics to ‘shift toward an
open and decentralized governing structure to create a new
political and social environment that can ensure proper and
responsible practices in politics’ (KDI & MOFE, 2004: 28).
Apart from the previous policies which aimed to promote
people or organizations’ participation in the provision,
management and planning of services, this dimension also has
three major strategies:
1. creating a participatory political and social environment
by measures such as online system for recommending
candidates for government positions and institutional
improvements, town hall meetings to discuss and make
recommendations on public official candidacies (also
applied to
government-affiliated organizations and
public corporations);
2. promoting participation of minority groups in decision
making and high ranking posts, e.g. women and disabled;
16

3. decentralization of power to local development which will
also mitigate regional imbalance (KDI & MOFE, 2004;
Kang M G, 2003).
Issues of Participatory Welfare
The progress of Participatory Welfare reform did not have a
smooth start. The policies were caught by conflicting interests
and ideological positions. The reforms received strong
resentment from those whose interests are being affected
adversely - the opposition party (e.g. Grand National Party,
GNP), bureaucrats, media, and even the trade unions. The
major challenge to it was the political conflicts or even turmoil
in the first one and a half years of Roh’s government, which
over-flowed into this domain.
The GNP certainly takes a very critical stance on the reforms.
The two parties (the GNP and the MDP) have different
opinions on social policies issues, for example, in the priorities
of growth-oriented or redistribution-oriented, and in pension
reforms.
If the government represents the liberal strand, arguing for
greater redistribution, the opposition camp represents the
conservative strand, protecting the long-standing social
structure and values. As shown in the above, Roh’s
government represents and reflects a ‘new tide of ideological
competition, the 20/30 generation, and voluntary
participation ‘which has replaced the ‘old order of regionalism,
personal charisma, and closed party politics’.
Roh’s government has adopted a series of ‘new’ and perhaps
‘unusual’ participatory policies that are unconventional in
17

Korea’s politics and as such are not well received by the
opposition. Occasionally, Roh has had to make compromises.
As a result, the initial stage of the reform was a sort of trial
and error, and therefore conducted in a stop-and-go manner,
even if not u-turns.
Larsen observes that Roh’s government has no connection to
the traditional elites which hindered him from promoting his
agenda (Larsen, 2003). The transition committee for the new
government excluded bureaucrats and was staffed by mainly
relatively young and reform-oriented academics. According to
Kim Yeon-myung, the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Health
and Welfare (MOHW) did not even prefer the term
‘Participatory Welfare’ and rejected the ideas of streamlining
the administrative structures (i.e., a more flexible resources
allocation system which would assign money to local
government, instead of through the Ministry, to enhance
efficiency and local autonomous) and by that weaken the
Ministry’s power, especially in the allocation of resources.
On another hand, Roh tried to accommodate the opposition
even at the very beginning of his office. For example, the
appointment of Goh Kun, a career bureaucrat as prime
minister, and the looking for advice on international relations
and economic policies from other bureaucrats, signified that
Roh has tried to seek a balance (Hoon J, 2003). Nevertheless,
he was not successful in achieving such a balance and conflicts
stepped up.
Major media, such as Chosun Ilbo, Dong-A Ilbo and
Joong-Ang Ilbo, do not support the government. At one time,
Roh heavily criticized the press for misinterpreting his policies
and being hostile to the government. The situation came as
18

‘pure principles of the campaign are tested severely by the
rough and tumble of actual governance; conflict with an
increasingly aggressive South Korea media’ (Larsen, 2003).
Before mid-2004, the parties supporting Roh was actually a
minority in the National Assembly. Mobilizing societal
support is an alternative for counteracting attacks. It is natural
for critics to see the government as governed by populism (i.e.,
government is tempted to go outside the legal system and
deal directly with the people when they encounter an
obstacles in reform), and brainwashing people into ‘believing
that only change and reform are right while tradition and
custom are wrong … progressiveness is good and
conservatism is bad’ (Moon C K, 2004:12). They also criticized
the government for an over-emphasis on direct democracy
which might only intensify the conflict between the
participants and the parliament, especially when the
parliament and even the new government are not experienced
enough to tackle such a level of participation, dynamism and
dilemmas (Hoon J, 2003; Lee C H, 2004:76).
The reforms are also challenged by the needs of balancing
protection / redistribution and flexibility / growth, just as in
Kim Dae-jung’s time (Lee H Y, 2004). The way that the
government handles labour disputes is a good example. Trade
unions are complaining the government is increasingly siding
with capital and therefore deviating from Roh’s initial
sympathetic attitude on legal and even illegal strikes. For
example, in the illegal strikes case of Doosan Heavy Industry
and Cargo Drivers Alliance, Roh expressed that ‘a proper
industrial relations cannot be established if the legitimate
demands are disregards just because the strike may have been
illegal’. The worsening economic climate in late 2003 and
19

political scandals have provided opportunities for the
opposite parties’ ‘disciplining’ of the government.
Since late 2003, Roh has expressed his view that efforts by
trade unions to shape the government can never be tolerated.
He publicly criticized and complained about union movement,
for example, in the cases of ChoHung Bank, new Free
Economic Zone Act, railway workers union strikes and
Hyundai Motors. He went on to question the moral and
ethical standards of the trade union leaders. The government’s
tough position on the labour movement has led to pro-capital
labour relations practices from 2004 (Lee W B, 2003, Ministry
of Labor, 2004).
The Roh government also has had to face up to the problems
inherent in the existing welfare systems. For example, the task
to design a Long-Term Care Insurance, reforming the pension
and National Health Insurance in view of the aging society,
the issues of sustainability of pension and health insurance
schemes. Any reform which asks for more contributions will
certainly raise concerns from the payers, and especially from
the employers who have to pay for their regular employees.
There are also debates about whether the government should
continue to reduce the replacement level and out-of-pocket
medical expenses, and the calls for improving efficiency and
accuracy of income reporting and fund management of the
major social security schemes (Kim Y M & Kim K S, 2005).
The idea of a welfare community state is very much
ideologically-driven, without a comprehensive assessment of
the various sectors capacity to participate. The concern over
family capacity to take care of the increasing burden is a good
example. Undoubtedly Korea is facing an aging society. More
20

problematic is that it comes at a time when demographic
trends are actually undermining the family capacity to care:
smaller family, lesser children, increasing divorce (e.g. crude
divorce rate is 3.0 in 2000), more women going out to work
and, hence, fewer people ready to give care. In 2000, 82% of
the family was nuclear family with an average family size of
3.1. Percentage of three-generation household has declined
from 23.2% in 1970 to 10.1% in 2000. In 2001, 17.3% of the
elderly were living alone (Shin & Shaw, 2003).
Kim Yeon-myung argues that the Korean family is still
influenced by Confucian concepts and is still willing to
uphold the family mutual obligations, but that it is already
taking up too many responsibilities that are beyond its
capacity. The family at the same time is burdened by
increasing spending in education and housing costs, and may
find it difficult to take care of the older generation.
Concerning the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), he
comments that they are not ready to participate in welfare
provision due to limited resources, their primary nature as
advocacy type organizations and therefore inexperienced in
providing welfare services. The public are also not ready,
either apathetic or lacking the capacity, to participate in the
daily operation and management of services, as prescribed in
the welfare community state construct.
Conclusion
Compared to Productive Welfare, Participatory Welfare has
greater emphasis on the participatory side, echoing the theme
of the Participatory Government. Participatory Welfare
policies themselves are not merely concerned with welfare
alone, but are in essence a social and political reform. The
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emphasis on participation is an appropriate response to the
call for wider democracy. The strategies, if succeeded, can also
help to address the problems of a lack of accountability and
transparency.
In the past few years, welfare reform has been overwhelmed
by political disputes. Welfare reforms themselves have also
led to the debates over the issues of redistribution of benefits
and costs. Improvements in social welfare services to fill the
gap are still on the way. While we cannot expect significant
achievement in just two or three years, the results achieved so
far are still limited.
The government itself is working to strike a balance among
different demands and social sectors. While addressing the
needs of reforms and participation, it has to take care of the
interests of traditional elites, bureaucrats and chaebols’
interest. This is more critical when the current government
cannot enjoy a majority in the National Assembly and the
President only has low popularity. The progress so far is not
significant, and except for the expansion of current services,
participation is still far from true.
At this stage, the success of Participatory Welfare not only
depends on how much resources the government is willing to
invest, or how it tackles the problems inherited in the welfare
systems, but also, and perhaps more important, on its tactics
to mediate conflicting interests in a society which is
increasingly mobilized.
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